This paper establishes a Kantian duty against screen overexposure. After defining screen exposure, I adopt a Kantian approach to its morality on the ground that Kant’s notion of duties to oneself easily captures wrongdoing in absence of harm or wrong to others. Then, I draw specifically on Kant’s ‘duties to oneself as an animal being’ to introduce a duty of self-government. This duty is based on the negative causal impact of the activities it regulates on a human being’s mental and (...) physical powers, and, ultimately, on the moral employment of these powers. After doing so, I argue that the duty against screen overexposure is an instance of the duty of self-government. Finally, I consider some objections. (shrink)

This paper will examine a novel argument in favour of entity grounding over fact-only grounding. The idea of this argument, roughly speaking, is that the proponents of fact-only grounding cannot provide a unified account of grounds of identity, whereas the proponents of entity grounding can. In this paper, I will give a response to this argument. Specifically, I will argue that the problem which this argument raises to the proponents of fact-only grounding is also a problem with which the proponents (...) of entity grounding are faced. Therefore, this argument fails to show that entity grounding is superior to fact-only grounding. Moreover, I will suggest that the failure of this argument points to a general lesson about the issue of grounds of identity facts. (shrink)

Dieser Buchtitel ist Teil des Digitalisierungsprojekts Springer Book Archives mit Publikationen, die seit den Anfängen des Verlags von 1842 erschienen sind. Der Verlag stellt mit diesem Archiv Quellen für die historische wie auch die disziplingeschichtliche Forschung zur Verfügung, die jeweils im historischen Kontext betrachtet werden müssen. Dieser Titel erschien in der Zeit vor 1945 und wird daher in seiner zeittypischen politisch-ideologischen Ausrichtung vom Verlag nicht beworben.

This volume traces the origins, contradictions and consequences of Marx's teaching on his followers. The author uses Marx to speak against the rigid dogmatism inherent in much of Marxism and concentrates on the interpretations of Marx's work by Max Weber.

This article analyses how child victims of abuse may be subjected to hermeneutical injustice. I start by explaining how child victims are hermeneutically marginalised by adults’ social and epistemic authority, and the stigma around child abuse. In understanding their abuse, I highlight two epistemic obstacles child victims may face: (i) lack of access to concepts of child abuse, thereby causing victims not to know what abuse is; and (ii) myths of child abuse causing misunderstandings of abuse. When these epistemic obstacles (...) cause the child victims to fail to see themselves as being abused and/or to get adults to recognise that they are being abused, I argue that this constitutes hermeneutical injustice. While some may justify obstructing epistemic access to concepts of abuse on the grounds of parental rights and protection of children’s innocence, I reply that both grounds are unjust in light of children’s basic rights and the fact that children can easily be taught such concepts in a child-appropriate manner. The case of child abuse prompts important reflections on existing epistemic injustice literature, particularly on the ways in which hermeneutical injustice materialises, the epistemic responsibilities of institutional bodies and individuals, and the interrelationship between testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. (shrink)

Recently, a number of metaphysicians have been working on the issue of the metaphysical grounds of identity facts. In this paper, I will survey a variety of accounts of identity facts through a particular lens. These accounts will be examined in light of the so-called ‘purity’ principle, a principle intriguing many discussions on metaphysical grounding in recent literature. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, I will indicate what sorts of accounts of identity facts the purity principle rules out (...) and what sorts of accounts it allows. Secondly, I will pinpoint some patterns of how the purity principle may interact with first-order metaphysical inquiries in general. (shrink)

It has been argued that human restoration of nature is morally problematic because artificially restored natural entities are artifacts, which are ontologically different from natural entities and hence essentially devoid of the moral standing that natural entities have. I discuss the alleged assimilation of restored natural entities to artifacts, and argue that it does not follow from the ontological differences, if any, between the artifactual and the natural that the former is morally inferior to the latter. This defense against the (...) devaluation of restored natural entities is aimed at narrowing the ethical gap between the wild and thetamed, which is often endorsed by ecocentric environmental ethics. (shrink)

In a recent work, Walter Carnielli and Abilio Rodrigues present an epistemically motivated interpretation of paraconsistent logic. In their view, when there is conflicting evidence with regard to a proposition A (i.e. when there is both evidence in favor of A and evidence in favor of ￢A) both A and ￢A should be accepted without thereby accepting any proposition B whatsoever. Hence, reasoning within their system intends to mirror, and thus, should be constrained by, the way in which we reason (...) about evidence. In this article we will thoroughly discuss their position and suggest some ways in which this project can be further developed. The aim of the paper is twofold. On the one hand, we will present some philosophical critiques to the specific epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic proposed by Carnielli & Rodrigues. First, we will contend that Carnielli & Rodrigues’s interpretation implies a thesis about what evidence rationally justifies to accept or believe, called Extreme Permissivism, which is controversial among epistemologists. Second, we will argue that what agents should do, from an epistemic point of view, when faced with conflicting evidence, is to suspend judgment. On the other hand, despite these criticisms we do not believe that the epistemological motivation put forward by Carnielli & Rodrigues is entirely wrong. In the last section, we offer an alternative way in which one might account for the epistemic rationality of accepting contradictions and, thus, for an epistemic understanding of paraconsistency, which leads us to discuss the notion of diachronic epistemic rationality. (shrink)

The purity principle requires that identity truths such as “Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus” are grounded. This argument from purity for the groundedness of identity truths for first-order entities can be naturally generalized to higher-order identities like “to be a vixen is to be a female fox.” In this paper, I will examine various accounts of the grounds of identity truths by taking the cases of higher-order identities into consideration. Drawing on some essentialist insights, I will propose a novel account (...) and argue that it offers an attractive explanation of how identities, including both first-order and higher-order cases, are grounded. (shrink)

In ways accentuated by the global coronavirus pandemic, corporations constitute vital instruments of the acts of beneficence needed by the people of the world to make progress in public health and increase collective and individual well-being. This article contributes to understanding the variety of moral forces that may lead corporations to commit acts of beneficence, including Friedman’s business case for corporate beneficence, the duty of beneficence as developed by business ethicists, and Dunfee’s social contract account of corporate obligation. Whereas Mejia (...) recently contributed to scholarship on corporate beneficence by expressly adopting shareholder primacy’s conception of corporate governance, this article embraces a stakeholder-oriented, managerialist picture of corporate governance. I extend the literature on beneficence by incorporating what I argue is the intuition underlying Dunfee’s contractualist formula of minimal contribution, namely that management’s duty to do good is awakened and unshackled to the extent management judges the corporation can afford to commit acts of beneficence, all stakeholders considered. The all-stakeholders-considered case for corporate beneficence compels management to act, I argue, when inaction would undermine the moral integrity of managers personally committed to promoting the well-being of humanity. (shrink)

These comments raise two main points based on Walschots’s response to Kleingeld’s ‘volitional’ interpretation of the contradiction involved in Kant’s Formula of Universal Law. The first concerns Walschots’s claim that, contrary to Kleingeld’s own account, her interpretation must in fact assume at least one essential purpose of the will, namely happiness. While Walschots characterises happiness as a necessary end of all rational beings, I clarify on textual grounds that, for Kant, happiness can be safely assumed as an actual end of (...) all rational finite beings. The second point regards Walschots’s claim that Kleingeld’s interpretation should be clearer on the two ways in which a volitional self-contradiction can arise. Drawing on Walschots’s instructive discussion, and on Timmermann’s conservative defence of a more traditional interpretation of the Formula against Kleingeld’s innovative proposal, I cautiously suggest that Kleingeld might end up having to accommodate three contradictions: the traditional contradictions in conception and in the will, and her volitional self-contradiction. (shrink)

The ethics of cultivated meat is an emerging field of applied ethics. As the world’s population increases, stakeholders, scholars, and producers have begun to devise new strategies to meet growing food needs and to prevent food production from having a deleterious environmental impact. In this paper, I will focus on the main moral arguments against the production and consumption of cultivated meat. I will then frame some arguments to show that none of the objections to the production and consumption of (...) cultivated meat is convincing.In the concluding remarks, I will suggest that cultivated meat should be considered as one strategy in a wide array of options to embrace a new food model. Deciding not to invest on this technology prevents us from benefiting from a useful means that could improve our living conditions. (shrink)

Collin (2022) attempts to break the symmetry between the modal ontological argument for the existence of God and the reverse modal ontological argument against the existence of God by drawing on some Kripkean lessons about a posteriori necessity. He argues that there is an undercutting defeater for taking God’s non-existence to be possible. In this paper, I reply that taking the Kripkean considerations about a posteriori necessity into account does not help break the symmetry. For we can argue in a (...) similar way that there is an undercutting defeater for taking God’s existence to be possible. (shrink)

Byerly recently developed a new solution to the gap problem for cosmological arguments. His idea is that the best explanation for why the necessary being is found to have necessary existence is that it is a perfect being. I raise an objection to Byerly’s solution on the ground that there is some rival naturalistic explanation that is as good as Byerly s theistic explanation.

Two crucial topics in the philosophy of medicine are the philosophy of nature and philosophical anthropology. In this essay I engage the philosophy of nature by exploring Anne Fagot-Largeault's study of norms in nature as a way of articulating a Confucian philosophy of medicine. I defend the Confucian position as a moderate naturalism.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:ARE THERE ECONOMIC RIGHTS? I 1]HE ISSUE OF whether there are any so-called " soia ~-~cono~ic r~~~ts," in addition to the so-called " civilpohtical nghts, · is not a new one. In 1948 the General Assembly of the United Nations app11oved the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which affirms that both those two types of claims are human rights. Since then some philosophers have been debating the issue of (...) whether claims to basic social-economic goods are rights at all. American Christians and theologians in general have not paid much attention to this until only recently, when the U.S. National Conference of Catholic Bishops issued,a pastoral letter on Catholic social teaching and the U.S. economy (entitled Economic Justice for All), which gained much attention from the media. In this pastoral letter the U.S. Catholic bishops also affirm that every human being in every society has economic rights against all members of society, all private-sector institutions and government.1 As a Christian philosopher, in this paper I want to probe into the issues of whether there are economic rights from a Christian and philosophical perspective. This paper is intended to he both critical and constructive-on the one hand I shall criticize some positions which I find unconvincing, and on the other I shall attempt to articulate my own thought on this issue. Some clarification of terminology is necessary before I embark on my project. Ever since Wesley Hohfeld's monumental 1 National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Economic Justice for AU: Pastoral Letter on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference, 1986), see sections 79-84. 703 704 PING-CHEUNG LO work in 1919 (Fundamental Legal Conceptions) it is a general practice among philosophers to distinguish claim-rights from liberty-rights. Throughout this paper, unless otherwise specified, the word "right" is used to designate claim-rights. Moreover, I am concerned only with moral rights rather than with legal rights, and largely with in rem rights (i.e., rights against individuals in,society or the world at large) rather than with in personam rights (i.e., rights against determinate individuals ). Therefore by "a right to x" I mean a morally valid or justified claim to x against individuals in society or the world at large as my entitlement or my due. Furthermore, the term " human right " is used to denote those moral rights that a person, simply as a human being, can have. They are usually supposed to include both civil-political rights (e.g., right to life, liberty, security) ·and social-economic rights (e.g., the right to food, clothing, shelter, health care, education, work, social security). As far as I know, there have been two major philosophical moves in criticizing the ideas of social-economic rights. The first one is set forth by Maurice Cmnston in the sixties.2 Besides giving a "political objection," he raises a three-fold "philosophical objection": social-economic rights do not possess the characteristics of (i) practicability, (ii) universality, and (iii) paramount importance, which he deems are the si,ne qua non of human rights. Though his criticisms are rather crude, most recent advocates of social-economic rights take them seriously and attempt to rebut his views.3 I do not have 2 Maurice Cranston, "Pope John XXIII on Peace and the Rights of Man," Political Quarterly 34 (Oct.-Dec. 1963), 380-90; "Human Rights, Real and Supposed," in Politioal Theory and the Rights of Man, ed. D. D. Raphael (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967), pp. 43-53; "Human Rights: A Reply to Professor Raphael," in ibid., pp. 95-100. s D. D. Raphael, "Human Rights, Old and New," in ibid., pp. 54-67; David Hollenbach, Olaims in Oonftict: Retrieving and Renewing the Oatholic Human Rights Tradition (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), pp. 31-33; John Langan, "Defining Human Rights: A Revision of the Liberal Tradition," in Human Rights in the Americas: The Struggle for Consensus, ed., Alfred Hennelly and John Langan (Washington, D. C.: Georgetown University Press, 1982), ARE THERE ECONOMIC RIGHTS? 705 the time to go into these arguments here. I just want to,say that I find... (shrink)

En el siguiente trabajo defenderé una postura contextualista respecto de los predicados evaluativos blandos, i.e. la idea de situar la perspectiva relevante dentro del contenido del enunciado. Sin embargo, mi propuesta se diferencia de otras posiciones contextualistas. Mostraré que una teoría que postule un enriquecimiento pragmático de los enunciados que involucran predicados evaluativos blandos es preferible a la opción indexicalista, que postula una variable oculta en la estructura gramatical profunda de la oración. Sostendré, en cambio, que enunciados como "Las manzanas (...) son deliciosas" varían su contenido de acuerdo al estándar de gusto relevante en el contexto de emisión debido a un proceso de modulación que ajusta el contenido semántico expresado por el predicado. Por último, argumentaré que no existe tal cosa como un desacuerdo sin falta más que en apariencia, contestando de esa manera la principal objeción relativista contra las posturas contextualistas. (shrink)

In this essay, I compare two pioneer thinkers of the “just war” tradition across cultures: Gratian in the Christian tradition, and Mengzi (Mencius) in the Confucian tradition. I examine their historical-cultural contexts and the need for both to discuss just war, introduce the nature of their treatises and the rudimentary theories of just war therein, and trace the influence both thinkers’ theories have had on subsequent just war ethics. Both deemed just cause, proper authority, and right intention to be necessary (...) conditions for initiating a just war. However, Gratian’s theory has a presumption against injustice whereas Mengzi’s theory has a presumption against war. As a jurist of the Church, Gratian sought to discriminate just from unjust wars, while Mengzi, a moral-political advisor to rulers, was more concerned with avoiding bloodshed and building lasting peace. In addition to examining these thinkers’ respective historical influences, I submit that Gratian’s Decretum and the Mengzi are pioneering in two more senses. First, they offer important clues to understanding how just war ideas were developed very differently in medieval Europe and in premodern China. Second, both embodied features that helped shape their subsequent intellectual tradition, which in turn molded the different legacies of these two works. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider points of intersection between the Aristotelian and the Galenic notions of ‘ power of the seed’ and some of the key issues and key concepts developed within the power -structuralism paradigm and try to understand whether, and to what extent, the conceptual lens provided by the power -structuralism hypothesis may help us to shed fresh light on aspects of both the Aristotelian and the Galenic theory of the seed, which are still unclear or highly controversial, (...) like the role played by the female in the generative process; to better understand how much the Aristotelian and the Galenic theories of the seed have in common and, on the other hand, to what extent and in what regard they differ when it comes to considering the metaphysics of powers, which both theories are grounded upon. Specifically, I explore how far Marmodoro's theory of ‘ power -structuralism ontology’ can help us to make better sense of this metaphysics. I suggest that this theory helps us to recognize, below the s. (shrink)

The paper lays the foundations for a duty of sustainable property use based on Kant’s Doctrine of Right. In doing so, it contributes to the project of extending the application of Kant’s philosophy to environmental issues so as to include his legal-political philosophy. After providing some context, focusing in particular on Kant’s property argument, I present and critically evaluate a recent argument for a duty of sustainable property use, put forward by Attila Ataner. Then, I draw on Reinhard Brandt’s and (...) Katrin Flikschuh’s interpretation of Kant’s permissive law in order to develop my own argument. According to my account, the duty of sustainable property use is rooted in Kant’s property argument, it is best construed in terms of interpersonal freedom, and it has a structure resembling that of duties of distributive justice. Unlike Ataner’s, my argument proceeds entirely within the domain of interpersonal freedom; it focuses clearly on the normative sense of usability; it does not overgenerate obligations; and it categorises the duty of sustainable property use within Kant’s taxonomy of duties. It thus constitutes a promising starting point to further investigate the connection between sustainability, Kant’s property argument and its use of a permissive law, and the Universal Principle of Right. (shrink)

In this article I argue that textual evidence from David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature does not support J. Baird Callicott's professedly Humean yet holistic environmental ethic, which understands the community (e.g., the biotic community) as a ‘metaorganismic’ entity ‘over and above’ its individual members. Based on Hume's reductionist account of the mind and his assimilation of the metaphysical nature of the mind to that of the community, I also argue that a Humean account of the community should be (...) likewise reductionist. My conclusion is that Callicott's anti-reductionist holism is at least foreign to, and at worst incompatible with, Hume's philosophy. (shrink)

It has been widely discussed, in recent years, which is the rational doxastic reaction in the face of peer disagreement. But not much has been said about aninteresting instance of that debate: philosophical peer disagreement. That is precisely what I will be concerned with in this paper. First, I will offer a definition ofphilosophical peer that introduces the idea of an epistemic perspective. The proposed definition allows for a doublé distinction: between Strong and Weak Peers, and between Strong and Weak (...) Disagreements. Based on these distinctions, I will defend that different doxastic reactions are required depending on the type of disagreement at issue. On the one hand, in the face of Weak Disagreement, we should be conciliatory. Cases of Strong disagreement, in turn, shouldn’t motívate a doxastic revision. In order to argue for that, some refinements into the notion of Rational Uniqueness will be needed. (shrink)

In this paper, I will defend a strategy for employing perfect being theology that Jeff Speaks calls “restriction strategy.” In Section I, I will outline what the restriction strategy is and explicate Speaks’s objection to it. In Section II, I will propose a response to Speaks’s objection. In Section III, the response will be refined to avoid objections. My contention will be that this refined version of perfect being theology avoids Speaks’s objection, and therefore can help theists find what divine (...) attributes God has. (shrink)

This is a contribution to the controversy which of individual or collective intentionality is more fundamental. I call it the fundamentality-question. In a first step, I argue that it is really two questions. One is about sense and one about reference. The first is: Can one grasp or understand the concept individual intentionality and, correspondingly, individuality, on the one hand, without grasping or understanding the concept collective intentionality and, correspondingly, collectivity, on the other? The second is: Can the concept individual (...) intentionality and corresponding concept of individuality, on the one hand, refer to something without the concept of collective intentionality and corresponding concept of collectivity referring to something, on the other? Simplifying somewhat, this elaborated fundamentality-question admits of nine answers. In a second step, I pursue a tentative answer to the elaborated fundamentality-question. Given a disambiguation of individuality and, correspondingly, individual intentionality, the answer is the combination of claims that individuality and individual intentionality in one sense is fundamental in reference-dependence but that collectivity and collective intentionality is fundamental in reference-dependence in the other sense of individuality, while collectivity and collective intentionality is in both cases fundamental in sense-dependence. (shrink)

In the paper I tackle a puzzle by Goldberg that challenges all of us as philosophers. There are three plausible thesis, separately defensible, that together seem to lead to a contradiction: 1) Reliability is a necessary condition for epistemic justification. 2) On contested matters in philosophy, philosophers are not reliable. 3) At least some philosophical theses regarding contested matters in philosophy are epistemically justified. In this paper I will assess the status of the puzzle and attempt to solve it. In (...) the first section, I'll present the puzzle with a little more detail. Secondly, I'll provide some general arguments to show that the alleged puzzle is not a legitimate one. Finally, in section 3, I will argue that even assuming that the puzzle can be coherently formulated, Goldberg's arguments in favor of premise are either unsound or too limited in their scope in order to represent a significant or interesting problem for philosophers. (shrink)

In “Philosophical Peer Disagreement” I argued that in order to properly account for the phenomenon of philosophical peer disagreement it is necessary to dropthe ‘same evidence’ condition from the definition of epistemic peerage. The reason is the following: different philosophical perspectives might come with different commitments concerning the evidential role of the same piece of data, and it would be wrong to deny the status of epistemic peer to someone that is acquainted with the same data, even if he does (...) not consider it plays an evidential role. However, on “On the Necessity of the Evidential Equality Condition For Epistemic Peerage,” Michele Palmira has developed some criticisms to these ideas. Here I defend my view from Palmira’s objections. (shrink)

In this paper I explore how early modern Italian Aristotelians understood Aristotle’s De memoria by focusing on three key-points of Aristotle’s theory of memory and recollection: the localization of memory in the perceptual part of the soul; the characterisation of phantasia and its association with the notions of koinē aisthēsis and prōton aisthētikon; the definition of recollection as “a kind of syllogism” and its account as an activity that implies the faculty of deliberating and is therefore restricted to humans. My (...) aim is to show the interactions as well as the tensions between natural philosophical and medical theories in reading and interpreting Aristotle’s Parva naturalia in the Italian milieu. (shrink)

The prepositional ‘in’ and possessive pronouns, e.g., ‘my’ and ‘mine,’ in the context of attributions of mental states, such as “in my mind” or “in your mind,” threaten to confuse attempts to account for knowledge of other minds. This paper distinguishes proper from improper uses of such expressions. I will argue that proper use of the prepositional ‘in’ and possessive pronouns in the context of mental state attributions presupposes capacities to properly track and attribute what are really, in a sense (...) to be specified, intersubjectively articulated and inferentially interrelated normative statuses. What we call “mental states” or “minds,” in as far as primarily cognitive states such as beliefs are concerned, are intersubjectively constituted. As opposed to being inner and private, something we must learn to intersubjectively discover, minds and mental states are intersubjectively articulated and we learn to attribute them as inner and private. A scorekeeping-model is used to illustrate how the privacy of mind presupposes intersubjectivity. Using that model, I argue that the traditional problem of knowing other minds can be re-framed as a problem of learning how to pursue intersubjective practices of acknowledging, attributing and undertaking mental states. (shrink)

In ‘Justice and Nature’, Thomas Nagel claims that social institutions are not responsible for inequalities caused primarily by nature, as opposed to socially caused inequalities. I evaluate this claim. To do so, I distinguish causal responsibility from substantive responsibility. I argue that Nagel rightly identifies conditions in virtue of which social institutions are not substantively responsible for an inequality, but the causal responsibility of nature is irrelevant for that assessment. The natural/social distinction is, I hold, misleading, and I offer two (...) pragmatic reasons to stop using it. Besides, past criticisms to the natural/social distinction have questioned whether identifying the causal responsability of nature for an inequality is descriptively meaningful, epistemically possible, and morally relevant. My reconstruction of Nagel’s view avoids these criticisms, I explain, by depriving the causal responsibility of nature of any role to identify an inequality as naturally caused. Moreover, I show that my reconstruction of Nagel’s view, purged of the natural/social distinction, helps to justify the asymmetrical treatment of class-based inequalities and inequalities among people with different native endowments in the Rawlsian principle of fair equality of opportunity. (shrink)

The text is concerned with a class of two-sided stochastic processes of the form. Here is a two-sided Brownian motion with random initial data at time zero and is a function of. Elements of the related stochastic calculus are introduced. In particular, the calculus is adjusted to the case when is a jump process. Absolute continuity of under time shift of trajectories is investigated. For example under various conditions on the initial density with respect to the Lebesgue measure,, and on (...) with we verify i.e. where the product is taken over all coordinates. Here is the divergence of with respect to the initial position. Crucial for this is the temporal homogeneity of in the sense that,, where is the trajectory taking the constant value. By means of such a density, partial integration relative to a generator type operator of the process is established. Relative compactness of sequences of such processes is established. (shrink)

Community-Based Tourism offers local residents opportunities to manage local tourism resources while sustaining their lifestyle at the same time. The research objective of the study was to explore the process and experience of communities in Northern Thailand which are known as elephant habitats, how these communities strive for stimulating the local economy without jeopardizing the way of life. The study was qualitative in nature. Qualitative data collection methods such as field observations and in-depth interviews were employed. The qualitative data were (...) further analyzed with thematic analysis. In practicing CBT, the findings identified positive factors, negative factors, and suggestions. The study found that the communities took pride in their cultural as well as natural resources and they are willing to commercialize these resources to a certain degree, i.e. founding elephant themed facilities, as has evidently been indicated. Consequently, as many issues factor into the practice of CBT, the study concluded that community participation and government support should have played a crucial role in maintaining new balance of overall local lifestyle sustainability and commercialization during and after the pandemic. (shrink)

This dissertation seeks to bridge the gulf between New Testament studies and Christian theological ethics by integrating them on the topic of Christian love for others--especially when such a love is correlated with the appeal to imitate God or Jesus Christ. The general goal of this endeavor is therefore to do an exercise in hermeneutics--to make the Scripture speak to contemporary Christians ethically. The specific goal, then, is to establish the rudiments of a complete ethical theory of Christian love which (...) is biblically based. ;In order to achieve these goals, this dissertation will carry out three tasks: the descriptive task--to ascertain exegetically the meaning of those passages of love which correlate love with imitation ; the interpretive task--to translate the moral messages contained in these passages from their first century vernacular into the contemporary, technical, ethical language; the evaluative task--to assess selected interpretations by recent Christian ethicists of individual texts on Christian love, and the message on Christian love in the New Testament in general. ;On the basis of the result of these descriptive and interpretive tasks, I formulate eight theses on a Christian ethics of love. I also find that many contemporary interpreters of Christian love have neglected many of these theses. (shrink)

Academics have the impression that human nature is good advocate Confucianism, Christianity should make the evil human nature. So when Matteo Ricci and other missionaries to China, agree that people are basically good in the Chinese writings of contemporary scholars do not think that Ricci would have just done for the purpose of mission compromise and will be attached. This article do not support this view. Through on Aquinas' Summa Theologica, "read the relevant chapter and" Mencius "rigorous analysis, I believe (...) that Ricci received" basically good "proposition has its theology support, and closer to Mencius, human nature is good on. However, the era of Matteo Ricci in China is also the era of the popular theory of Wang Yangming. In this article, by a large number of text analysis, pointed out that Wang's human nature is good and Mencius on human nature is good vary widely. Thus, while certainly human nature is good Matteo Ricci, the other critics' re the first, "said, has its theoretical basis. In fact, this return to Mencius Ricci, resist the neo-Confucian practice, is the common position of the Qing Dynasty Han scholars. In this paper, Dai Zhen and Chen Li as an example to illustrate how they both certainly Mencius on human nature is good, but criticized the excessive expansion of human nature is good Song learning theory. Therefore, the Ricci's human nature is good, unexpectedly affected the development of Confucianism in the Qing Dynasty. A large number of contemporary Chinese somehow got the impression that whereas the key tenet of Confucianism is the Thesis of the Innate Goodness of Human Nature, the key tenet of Christianity is the opposite, viz., The Thesis of the Innate Evilness of Human Nature. When Matteo Ricci and his fellow Jesuit missionaries came to China and learnt Chinese culture, Ricci endorses the Thesis of the Innate Goodness of Human Nature in his Chinese book The True Meaning of The Lord of Heaven. Some contemporary Chinese scholars find this endorsement unreasonable and argue that Ricci's endorsement strains the interpretation of Christian doctrine for the appeasement of Confucian literati. This article argues that such contemporary Chinese assessments are based on a misunderstanding of Christian thought. A meticulous reading of relevant sections of Summa Theologiae by Thomas Aquinas shows that there is no conflict between Catholic theological anthropology and the theory of human nature according to Menzi. However, Ricci and his company came to China when the thought of Wang Yangming, one major school of neo-Confucianism, was very influential. Ostensibly Wang also endorses the Innate Goodness of Human Nature, but a careful reading of his works indicates that there is a tremendous difference his thesis and that of Menzi. The latter advocates only that there is a "sprout of goodness" in human nature whereas the former advocates the fill presence of supreme goodness in human nature. Accordingly, it is legitimate for Ricci to endorse the Thesis of the Innate Goodness of Human Nature in the sense of Menzi and simultaneously reject the Thesis of Uncovering the Supreme Goodness in Human Nature of the neo-Confucians. In fact, Ricci's stance of aligning with Menzi in opposition to Song-Ming neo-Confucianism is a common stance of most Qing Confucian scholars. For example, among his fierce criticisms, one of Dai Zhen's critiques is against the neo-Confucian Thesis of Uncovering the Supreme Goodness in Human Nature. He argues that Mengzi's view of "developing the good inclinations" is conducive to the cultivation of virtues whereas neo-Confucians' view of "uncovering our original supreme goodness," misled by Buddhism and Daoism, is not. Very recent historical scholarship in mainland China articulates a view that Dai Zhen has carefully read Ricci's book The True Meaning of The Lord of Heaven and borrows views from it. In fact, according to these historians, Dai Zhen and a closed circle of court scholars who are in charge of compiling the Siku quanshu have read all the works of the Jesuit missionaries and admire their scholarship. Hence the first encounter between Christian civilization and Confucian civilization helped develop the Han School of Learning in opposition to the Song School of Learning in the early Qing Dynasty. (shrink)

In PV 3.440ab and 473cd–474ab, Dharmakīrti raises the argument of infinite regress twice. The argument originates from the same argument stated by Dignāga in his Pramāṇasamuccaya 1.12ab1, in which the fault of infinite regress is called aniṣṭhā. In Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti 1.12b2, Dignāga presents another type of argument of infinite regress driven by memory, which is elucidated by Dharmakīrtian commentators. The arguments were criticized by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Bhaṭṭa Jayanta and even more intensively so by two modern scholars, Jonardon Ganeri and Birgit (...) Kellner. In this paper, I first examine the source of the arguments—Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti 1.12 and its translation, based on which I provide my interpretation of the two models of arguments of infinite regress. I then offer my response, according to Dharmakīrti and his commentators, to Ganeri’s and Kellner’s critiques. By doing so, I attempt to identify the essence of these arguments is and find out to what extent one can defend the infinite regress argument in Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s theory. (shrink)

A 120 anni dalla sua nascita, la filosofia politica di Popper continua a stimolare sia gli studiosi che per primi ne divulgarono le opere sia coloro che s'interrogano sull’attualità del suo insegnamento. Il mondo nel quale Popper ha concepito le sue opere era segnato dallo scontro ideologico, quello di oggi è attraversato da conflitti di natura diversa, riconducibili alle tensioni nelle società multiculturali. Se scegliere i valori della società aperta pare un obiettivo inderogabile, rimangono aperte le sfide della sua traduzione (...) in una realtà sociale complessa. Sfide che Armando editore è, ancora una volta, in linea con la sua storia, pronto a raccogliere e tradurre in studi e ricerche. (shrink)

This study traces the philosophical evolution of the idea of shen and its ethicoreligious implications based on a series of debates over the immortality of shen that transpired in China from the fourth to the sixth century. Then, on the basis of the philosophical arguments developed in these debates, I shall trace the genesis of a Confucian metaphysics back to early medieval times when Confucianism was confronting the intellectual challenge of Buddhism. Scholars have believed that it was not until the (...) burgeoning of Neo-Confucianism in the Song dynasty that a Confucian metaphysics was inspired by Buddhism and Daoism. This study, however, would challenge this conventional view and argue that as early as the fifth century Confucians already began to formulate a metaphysic of self-cultivation under the multiple influences of Neo-Daoism and Buddhism. ;In the study of world religions the English term "soul" appears to be one of the primary concerns and its various meanings overlap considerably in different religions. In order to understand what the historian of religions is actually concerned about, we need to let the religious idea, "soul," speak for itself in a given culture. This study shows that in Chinese religion, shen, as the ultimate source of ethical values, determined the conception of man and justified human dignity in an age of political and social turbulence. Hence, this study will alert the historian of religions to the cultural and philosophical factors that could possibly shape the conception of the "soul" in a culture. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to argue for the necessity of dialectic in Aristotelian philosophy—dialectic defined as the art of arguing from probable opinions to contradictory conclusions. In particular, I will argue that dialectic is necessary for definition. In the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle identifies three principles of scientific demonstration: axioms, un-middled premises, and definitions. In showing the need for dialectic to define, I also show scientific knowledge’s dependence on dialectic.